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The creation of protocols for autonomous intersection management is an active research
topic with the potential of increasing the capacity of intersections addressing the increasing
demand on roads. Most of the proposed protocols assume that all the vehicles involved will
behave pro-socially, that is, in a way that improves the outcome of the system over their
individual gain. We simulated three different autonomous intersection protocols, two centra-
lized and one decentralized, introducing some egoistic agents that we call deceiving vehicles.
Deceiving vehicles may decide to transmit false information while using a protocol if they
detect that doing so can result in a lower delay in the intersection. Our simulations show
that in two of the protocols, it is possible for a deceiving vehicle to experience lower delay
times compared to its non-deceiving counterparts. Additionally, as more deceiving vehicles
enter the system the overall capacity of an intersection can be reduced, increasing delays for
non-deceiving vehicles which creates an incentive for more vehicles to deceive. We pose that,
given that vehicles have an incentive to deceive, autonomous intersection protocol’s authors
need to consider deceiving vehicles in their design and include measures to prevent them,
thus avoiding the performance degradation they produce.
Keywords: Autonomous vehicles, internet of vehicles (IoV), deceiving agents, traf-
fic model, autonomous intersection
Resumen
La creación de protocolos de manejo autónomo de intersecciones es un tema de investigación
activo que tiene el potencial de aumentar la capacidad de las intersecciones aportando a la
solución del problema del creciente aumento en la demanda en las v́ıas. La mayoŕıa de los
protocolos propuestos asumen que todos los veh́ıculos se comportan de manera prosocial, es
decir, que actúan de una manera que beneficia al sistema sobre su propio beneficio. Nosotros
simulamos tres protocolos de intersección autónomos, dos centralizados y uno descentraliza-
do, introduciendo algunos agentes egóıstas que llamamos veh́ıculos engañosos. Los veh́ıculos
engañosos pueden decidir transmitir información falsa cuando usan un protocolo si detec-
tan que hacerlo puede resultar una demora menor en la intersección. Nuestras simulaciones
muestran que, en dos de los protocolos, es posible que los veh́ıculos engañosos experimenten
demoras menores frente a sus contrapartes no-engañosos. Asimismo, conforme más veh́ıculos
engañosos son introducidos en el sistema, la capacidad total de la intersección se ve redu-
cida, aumentando las demoras para los veh́ıculos que no son engañosos lo que genera un
incentivo para que más veh́ıculos sean engañosos. Proponemos que, dado que los veh́ıculos
x
tienen incentivos para engañar, los autores de protocolos de intersecciones autónomas deben
considerar los veh́ıculos engañosos en su diseño e incluir medida para prevenirlos, evitando
aśı la degradación en rendimiento que producen.
Palabras clave: Veh́ıculos autónomos, internet de los veh́ıculos, agentes engañosos,
modelo de tráfico, intersección autónoma.
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1 Introduction
Our work revolves around self-driving cars and the collaboration between them to achieve
safe intersection crossings without the need for traffic signals, such as traffic lights. The
collaboration is possible because vehicles can communicate and coordinate to adapt their
speed to match the requirements for a safe crossing. To understand how to introduce decep-
tion in a system of autonomous vehicles and intersection, we first need to understand the
technologies involved; for that reason, in this section, we present the concepts of self-driving
cars and collaborative intersections.
1.1. Self-driving cars
While road vehicles have evolved over the years, from horse-pulled carriages to automobiles,
they have always placed a human driver in control. With the increase in computing power,
reduction in size, new sensors, and the ability to interpret the sensors’ information in real-
time and react accordingly, self-driving cars are moving from the realm of ideas to reality
[Mirnig et al., 2017].
SAE International1 describes six different levels of autonomy for driving automation systems,
ranging from the user driving with different driver supporting features at levels 0 through 2 to
automated driving features in different conditions in levels 3 to 5 [SAE International, 2018].
Vehicles currently sold by most manufacturers have some driving assistance level with fea-
tures like automatic emergency braking and adaptive cruise control, among others; these
vehicles can be classified at level 0 to 2 [Teoh, 2020].
Currently, several companies, including Tesla, GM, Ford, Honda, among others, are inves-
ting in the development of self-driving cars with features ranging in SAE levels 3 to 5 and
targeting market releases during the next years [Faggella, 2020]. Waymo, Google’s sister
company under the Alphabet umbrella working on self-driving cars, is currently offering a
taxi service using self-driving cars in Phoenix, Arizona in the United States, which matches
the requirements for level 4 automation [Tang et al., 2020].
1https://www.sae.org
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Figure 1-1: Levels of driving automation from SAE J3016 [SAE International, 2018]. Re-
produced as-is.
1.2. Collaboration between self-driving cars
In parallel with the development of more advanced driver assistance and driving automa-
tion features, cars are also becoming more connected [Rios-Torres and Malikopoulos, 2017].
Communication between vehicles can reduce accidents and increase the efficiency in the use
of road infrastructure [Li and Tiwari, 2018].
Vehicles need to communicate with different actors; this generates the need for vehicle to
everything communication (V2X) as shown in figure 1-2. Of particular interest to our work is
the communication from a vehicle to a vehicle (V2V) and between vehicles and infrastructure
(V2I). Another common form of communication found in the literature is between vehicles
and pedestrians (V2P) [Jiménez et al., 2016].
Given that the different actors in the network change positions relative to each other fre-
4 1 Introduction
Figure 1-2: Communication possibilities enabled by Vehicular ad-hoc Networks (VANETs).
Using VANETs technologies enables V2X communication such as vehicle to
vehicle (V2V), vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to pedestrian (V2P).
quently, any network solution needs to be wireless. Additionally, its topology needs to ac-
commodate rapid changes in the location and presence of actors. Vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs), which are mobile ad-hoc networks adapted to vehicles, were created by the aca-
demy and industry to address these challenges [Fontes et al., 2017].
With communication in place, cars can share information to implement multiple collabo-
rative driver assistances (CoDAS). Cooperative frontal collision avoidance (CFCA), where
vehicles communicate their relative positions and alert each other of possible collisions and
cooperative intersection collision prevention (CICP) are examples of possible uses of com-
munication to implement CoDAS features [Sawade and Radusch, 2016].
The communication protocols for V2X are a topic of discussion both in the academy and
regulatory agencies across the world. Two options are the leading contenders, dedicated
short-range communication (DSRC) and cellular vehicle to everything (C-V2X). C-V2X,
regulated by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), uses the existing cellular
infrastructure in 4G and 5G variations for communication; however, there are concerns about
its latency, and tests of the technology are only just starting in the real world. Meanwhile,
DSRC uses the IEEE 802.11p (also known as wireless access for vehicular environments -
WAVE-) standard as its base and defines different protocols for different applications. DSRC
uses the TCP/IP stack for non-safety applications and the WAVE short message protocol
(WSMP) for safety ones like CoDAS or autonomous intersection management protocols.
There are currently DSRC’s road-side units (RSUs) deployed in countries like the United
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States or Portugal already using DSRC. The doubts surrounding DRSC are its limitations
when too many nodes are close together as it uses multicast, and nodes have to process all
the information they receive in real-time [Kiela et al., 2020].
1.3. Autonomous intersection protocols
In our work, the main interest of collaboration between self-driving cars is to implement au-
tonomous intersections. In an autonomous intersection, vehicles communicate either directly
or through an RSU to define the order in which they can traverse an intersection in a safe
manner [Chen and Englund, 2016].
Figure 1-3: Number of autonomous intersection articles in the Scopus database since 2011.
Some simulations of autonomous intersection protocols have shown delay reductions of up to
85 % compared to traffic lights [Azimi et al., 2013b]. With these results, academic attention
on the topic of autonomous intersections has increased, as seen in figure 1-3. We can see
an accelerated rate of articles published over recent years. Given that intersections are a
bottleneck and a source of accidents in transit networks; this further explains the research
interest as increases in efficiency and safety in intersections translate to fewer accidents,
lower waiting times, and higher infrastructure capacity [Chen and Englund, 2016].
Autonomous intersection protocols can be classified based on their communication strategy
as either centralized or decentralized. They can also be classified based on their algorithm
approach as either consensus or reservation oriented, as seen in figure 1-4. In centrali-
zed protocols, all vehicles communicate with a centralized piece of infrastructure known
as a Road-side Unit (RSU). Commonly shared information includes position, vehicle size,
speed, acceleration/deceleration profile, vehicle identifiers, among others. Decentralized pro-
tocols share similar information, but between the vehicles instead of through a central unit
[Namazi et al., 2019].
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Figure 1-4: Classification of autonomous intersection protocols by their communication
(centralized or decentralized) and type of algorithm (reservation or consensus).
In terms of the algorithm used, reservation-based systems keep track of matrices represen-
ting the time and space either free for vehicles to use to traverse the intersection or already
reserved by a particular vehicle. Different protocols present different granularity levels for
the grids used, heuristics to assign reservations to vehicles, and expiration periods for gran-
ted reservations [Dresner and Stone, 2008]. Our literature search has found only centralized
versions for reservation-based protocols since they require a trusted third party to keep the
reservation matrices.
On the other hand, consensus-based protocols use heuristics or mathematical models to
decide which vehicle or road to assign priority over a time-lapse. Proposals for consensus-
based protocols can be found in centralized and distributed flavors and generally differ in the
rules for communication and consensus reaching. In table 1-1, we present some examples of
autonomous intersection works classified by their communication and algorithmic approach.
In our work, we consider autonomous intersections as Open Multi-Agent Systems (MAS)
since the agents involved can have heterogeneous abilities and belong to different organiza-
tions [Pinyol and Sabater-Mir, 2013]. One characteristic of these kinds of systems is that the
intent of the different agents is not necessarily known to the other agents. As such, systems
can incorporate agents that behave in a pro-social, antisocial, or deceiving way either all the
time or based on their perception of the environment and the actions of other agents.
Looking at recent works in intelligent transportation systems, mainly referring to autono-
mous intersection protocols, we found that it is not common for works to consider agents
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Protocol family Examples
Centralized consensus [Al-qutwani and Wang, 2019, Ashtiani et al., 2018,
Azimi et al., 2011, Gao et al., 2013,
Morales Chavarro et al., 2020, Wu et al., 2016,
Kim and Kumar, 2015, Kim, 2013, Kneissl et al., 2018,
Zheng et al., 2017]
Centralized reservation [Bento et al., 2012, Li et al., 2015, Buckman et al., 2019,
Li and Tiwari, 2018]
Decentralized consensus [Khoury and Khoury, 2014, Azimi et al., 2014,
Savic et al., 2017, Mendoza et al., 2017, Li et al., 2018,
Azimi et al., 2012, Azimi et al., 2013a, Vaio et al., 2019,
Wu et al., 2017, Azimi et al., 2013b, Makarem and Gillet, 2012,
Bifulco et al., 2019, Saiáns-Vázquez et al., 2018,
Park et al., 2018, Buzachis et al., 2018,
Aoki and Rajkumar, 2019, Khoury et al., 2019, Wei et al., 2018]
Table 1-1: Examples of articles describing protocols classified by their communication and
algorithm.
that are not pro-social. Some examples of protocols that only consider pro-social agents can
be found in [Ashtiani et al., 2018, Wu et al., 2016, González et al., 2019]. However, we also
found some recent work that explores the effect of different types of agents. In
[Bentjen et al., 2018], the authors explore how antisocial agents can disrupt an intersection.
Additionally, in [Buckman et al., 2019], we found an autonomous intersection protocol that
considers the agent social disposition to propose alternative ordering of vehicles when cros-
sing an intersection from a purely first-come-first-served protocol.
1.4. Contribution
Our work uses simulation to explore deceiving in three autonomous intersection protocols.
We model a scenario with two intersecting roads with a single lane and no turns enabled for
each of the protocols. In each run of the simulation, we use the number of vehicles entering
and the proportion of them that are deceivers as parameters for each lane. Based on the
simulation results, we evaluate, in a qualitative manner, the relative impact of introducing
additional deceivers while maintaining the other parameters constant.
We show that deceivers can have an effect on the capacity of an autonomous intersection
affecting the expected delays for vehicles in the incoming lanes. We pose that future au-
tonomous intersection works should consider incorporating measures to prevent deceiving
vehicles to avoid degrading their potential capacity.
2 Problem and objectives
2.1. Problem
According to our review of the literature, the current proposals for collaboration between
autonomous vehicles consider either pro-social agents that are committed to reach a social
maximum utility, or anti-social agents that look to damage other agents in the system or to
disrupt the system itself. In MAS literature, some research has addressed deceiving agents,
but such work has not been applied to self-driving cars.
We identify that there is the potential for deceiving vehicles to exploit the algorithms and
protocols proposed for autonomous intersection management, to gain an advantage over the
other agents maximizing their own utility function while consequentially affecting the utility
of others. In this work, we want to answer the following question:
What is the effect of introducing deceiving agents to a flow of collaborative self-driving cars
in an intersection crossing?
2.2. Objectives
2.2.1. Main objective
To analyze the effects of introducing deceiving agents on a flow of collaborative self-driving
cars crossing an intersection with a single configuration of lanes and allowed movements.
2.2.2. Support objectives
1. To propose a computational model of collaborative self-driving cars to cross an inter-
section incorporating deceiving agents for a particular type of intersection.
2. To implement the proposed computational model as a simulation.
3. To evaluate the results of the simulation in different scenarios based on the amount of
deceiving agents.
3 Deceiving in autonomous intersections
Our review of existing autonomous intersection models shows that most of the protocols
consider their agents (vehicles) to behave pro-socially. Because of this belief, most protocols
do not take measures to prevent agents from manipulating the information they share to
gain an advantage (i.e., lower wait times) over the system’s other agents. We call agents, in
our case vehicles, that try to gain an advantage by manipulating information deceiving other
vehicles. The effect that these agents can have on the system and how much of an advantage
they can get is our focus.
3.1. Deception model
In our model, when a deceiving vehicle approaches an intersection and starts the process to
gain access to it, either by a reservation or consensus reaching protocol, it follows a series
of steps to decide if it should deceive and how to do it. As seen in figure 3-1, for each of
the protocols that we intend to implement deceivers into, we analyze the protocol to find
a deceiving strategy, implement it in simulation, and analyze the results of the deception.
We went through this process, iterating multiple times for each protocol. In the following
sections, we present each of the protocols selected for our simulations, describing: how to
accomplish deception, how we implemented the simulations and the results we obtained.
Our deceiving vehicles perceive their environment frequently and detect when, following
each protocol’s rules, they can deceive to avoid having to stop at an intersection. When a
deceiving vehicle detects that it can avoid losing priority by deceiving, it forges a message
that increases its chances of receiving the priority and sends it to the other actors in the
system depending on the protocol in use. On the other hand, suppose the deceiving vehicle
expects that the protocol will prioritize it in the intersection; in that case, it will send a
message without forgery to lower the chances of being marked as a deceiver.
Note that it is not in the interest of deceiving vehicles to jeopardize the intersection’s safety.
Affecting the intersection’s safety could lead to accidents, which would increase the decei-
ving vehicle delay. As such, the deceiving strategies used by our deceiving vehicles do not
compromise the safety characteristics of the protocols.
For each of the selected protocols, we simulated an intersection with two roads. We consider
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Figure 3-1: Deception model for autonomous vehicles. The model has to be adapted with
rules specific to the protocol. The inner box shows the deceiving algorithm
followed by vehicles. We performed the activities outside of the box to find
deceiving strategies for each of the protocols.
road A, with vehicles traveling north to south, and road B, with vehicles traveling west to
east. We have two parameters per road: the traffic rate (RateA and RateB) and the proba-
bility that vehicles are deceivers (ProbabilityA and ProbabilityB). Our goal is to visualize
the effect of introducing deceivers in each protocol with different traffic levels.
We captured the entry and exit times, for each vehicle, in each simulation for the period of si-
mulated time. With this information we calculate CountA and CountB as the number of vehi-
cles served by each road along with CountALL = CountA + CountB. Additionally, following
the definition of a delay from the Highway Capacity Manual 2010: “Additional travel time ex-
perienced by a driver, passenger, bicyclist, or pedestrian beyond that required to travel at the
desired speed” [National Research Council (U.S.). Transportation Research Board., 2010]; we
calculated the delays DelayA, DelayB and DelayALL as the delay introduced by the inter-
section for vehicles in lane A, lane B, and both lanes together, respectively.
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As discussed in chapter 1, the most common types of autonomous intersection protocols
can be classified as centralized consensus, centralized reservation and distributed consensus
protocols. In the following sections we present the selected protocols in each of the categories
and how a deceiving vehicle can try to gain an advantage in each of them. For each of the
protocols we also discuss how the simulation was implemented and the results we obtained.
4 Centralized consensus
To test the concept of deceiving vehicles, we decided to create a simple simulation based
on a consensus protocol using a mathematical model. This model handles two roads of one
lane each as seen in figure 4-1; in each instant, the RSU considers only the vehicle closest to
the intersection for each lane. As described in chapter 3, we consider road A, with vehicles
traveling north to south, and road B, with vehicles traveling west to east. We have two
parameters per road: the traffic rate (RateA and RateB) and the probability that vehicles
are deceivers (ProbabilityA and ProbabilityB). The RSU assigns priority to the vehicle that
would spend the longer waiting if it were to yield. To simplify the protocol further, it only
considers vehicles moving at a constant speed or completely stopped, which implies an instant
acceleration and deceleration [Morales Chavarro et al., 2020].
Figure 4-1: Screenshot of the simulator used for the centralized consensus protocol. It pre-
sents two lanes that conflict with each other at an intersection; lane A running
from north to south and lane B running from west to east.
Under this protocol, a deceiving vehicle A can listen to the communication between vehicle
B, from the other lane, and the RSU before sending its message. Consider a case where
vehicle A calculates that the RSU will make it yield; in that case, it will change its message
to the RSU to indicate that its length is longer than it is. The message will convince the
RSU that vehicle A will arrive earlier at the intersection and will wait for longer than vehicle
B if instructed to yield.
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It is important to note that deceiving about the vehicle’s length does not compromise safety.
As a result of the deceiving about the vehicle length, the RSU will assign a longer time to
traverse the intersection to the vehicle, guaranteeing it can clear the intersection. Supposing
that the vehicle deceived about its position instead, the time allocated by the RSU for it
would be the same as without deception. However, the RSU would be able to assign a slot
of time for a conflicting vehicle while the deceiver has not yet clear the intersection leading
to potential accidents.
We implemented this simulation in Python with a 50 ms simulation step. The maximum
speed for all vehicles was 8,33 m/s, which is approximately 30 km/h. We captured the entry
and exit times of all vehicles in CSV files that were ingested to a MongoDB database for
analysis.
4.1. Results
This section presents our results for the decentralized consensus protocol, considering two
scenarios: one where both lanes have the same traffic volume (symmetric traffic) and another
where there is a different traffic volume per lane (asymmetric traffic). 1
4.1.1. Symmetric traffic
We first consider the case when both lanes have the same traffic volume, i.e., RateA =
RateB, as shown in Figure 4-2. In general, the total number of vehicles that can traverse
the intersection goes down as the probability that each vehicle is a deceiver in the other lane
increases. However, we see a different trend when one lane consists entirely of deceivers, i.e.,
if either ProbabilityA = 1 or ProbabilityB = 1. In this case, as we increase the probability of
having deceivers in the other lane, the number of vehicles served by the intersection increases.
We can also consider the difference in the delays experienced by vehicles in each of the
lanes and the system. Figure 4-3 shows that while ProbabilityA increases, the lane’s delay
is reduced as a higher percentage of deceivers is introduced. It is worth noticing that this
impacts lane B, where the delays increase, and explain the reduction in the number of
vehicles that can traverse the intersection. When all the vehicles in lane A are deceivers
(ProbabilityA = 1), and there are no deceivers in lane B (ProbabilityB = 0), vehicles in lane
A receive priority all the time, causing most of the vehicles in lane B to experience delays
above 60 seconds.
1We presented the results for this protocol in the 2020 IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things. This
section includes a revised portion of our article [Morales Chavarro et al., 2020].
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Figure 4-2: Results for symmetric traffic where RateA = RateB = 2 vehicle/s. Each point
represents the proportion of vehicles that went through the system against the
maximum across all the experiments shown in the graph. For this combination
of rates, the maximum number of vehicles were served with ProbabilityA =
ProbabilityB = 0. Each of the lines represents a value of ProbabilityB.
Figure 4-3: Delay for vehicles in lane A (left), lane B (center) and both lanes (right),
with a symmetric traffic rate where RateA = RateB = 2 vehicles/s and
ProbabilityB = 0.
4.1.2. Asymmetric traffic
In Figure 4-4, we can see the proportion of vehicles served by the intersection in the asym-
metric case in which RateA > RateB. The figure shows that, for each value of ProbabilityB,
the number of vehicles reaches a maximum when some deceivers are introduced in lane A,
specifically when ProbabilityA > ProbabilityB. We observe this behavior even when there
are no deceivers in lane B.
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Figure 4-4: Results for asymmetric traffic where RateA = 2 vehicles/s and RateB =
1 vehicle/s. Each point represents the proportion of vehicles that went th-
rough the system against the maximum across all the experiments shown in
the graph. For this combination of rates, the maximum number of vehicles we-
re served with ProbabilityA = 0,25 and ProbabilityB = 0. Each line represents
a value of ProbabilityB.
In figure 4-5, when looking at the delays for the asymmetric scenario without deceivers
in lane B (ProbabilityB = 0), we can see that the median delay increases for lane B as
ProbabilityA increases. However, as we saw in Figure 4-4, the number of vehicles served by
the intersection increases as well.
Figure 4-5: Delay for vehicles in lane A (left), lane B (center) and both lanes (right), with
an asymmetric traffic rate where RateA = 2 vehicles/s, RateB = 1 vehicle/s
and ProbabilityB = 0.
Since deceiving increases the combined waiting times for the deceivers and the vehicles
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being deceived, it is counterintuitive to see that the capacity of the intersection increases as
the number of deceivers increases. The capacity increase happens because the system only
considers the projected delays for the first vehicle in each of the lanes when deciding which
lane to prioritize. When the spaces between vehicles are generally short, a primary delay to
one vehicle will likely result in a secondary delay to the vehicle directly behind it. Therefore,
these secondary delays multiply the impact of the primary delays caused by yielding priority
to vehicles in the other lane. It can be beneficial to allow a certain amount of deceivers on
the lane with more frequent secondary delays, namely the lane with higher traffic flow, to
minimize their impact.
5 Centralized reservation
For the centralized reservation protocol, we used the Autonomous Intersection Management
(AIM) from Dresner and Stone from the University of Texas [Dresner and Stone, 2008]. This
protocol is one of the first developed and provides plenty of flexibility in terms of the layout
of the roads that can be supported. They publish their simulator under an open source
license.
The AIM protocol uses a reservation system and supports multiple policies to assign reser-
vations in the intersection. Their primary policy, and the one we experimented with, is the
First-Come First-Served (FCFS) policy. In this policy, the first vehicle to request a reserva-
tion for a path connecting two points through the intersection for a period of time gets its
reservation granted. The FCFS policy splits the intersection in a grid that it uses to keep
track of the reservations. The number of partitions for the grid is a parameter that they
explored to optimize it depending on the number of lanes. As described in chapter 3, we
consider road A, with vehicles traveling north to south, and road B, with vehicles traveling
west to east. We have two parameters per road: the traffic rate (RateA and RateB) and the
probability that vehicles are deceivers (ProbabilityA and ProbabilityB).
When a vehicle is the next to arrive at an intersection in a lane, it sends messages to the RSU
describing the desired entry and exit lanes and the vehicle characteristics. The RSU will then
calculate the required tiles for the reservation and in which timeframe they are required for
the vehicle to traverse safely. If all the tiles are available, the RSU will respond with a message
granting the reservation, including the reservation description detailing the path that the
vehicle is expected to follow through the intersection among corresponding timeframes. The
RSU can also propose alternative reservations using different lanes if the ones requested by
the vehicle are not available. If it is not possible, the reservation gets denied, and the vehicle
will have to wait a buffer time until it can try to request a reservation again.
Figure 5-1 presents an example of the reservation matrix for an intersection at three diffe-
rent moments. Consider the case where vehicles A,B, and C arrive at an intersection and
request a reservation. Vehicles A and B are traveling parallel to each other in different lanes
and can share the intersection simultaneously as presented in t1 and t2. Vehicle C travels
perpendicular to A and B and can potentially collide with them; for this reason, it is only
allowed in the intersection at time t3.
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Figure 5-1: Representation of the reservation matrices for three moments in time in an
intersection for a centralized reservation protocol. In t1, vehicles A and B can
access the intersection while vehicle C is not authorized because its trajectory
would conflict with A and B. In t3, vehicle C can finally gain a reservation as
vehicle B is no longer in conflict.
A deceiving vehicle starts to request a reservation before its preceding vehicle has gone
through the intersection to gain an advantage in this protocol, thus exploiting the FCFS
policy. As multiple vehicles can arrive from different directions, the deceiving vehicle does
not have the full information of the vehicles involved. In this situation, it must implement
heuristics to avoid reserving the same space and time that the vehicle in front of it needs to
use; we present the values for the heuristics in table 5-1.
The AIM simulator is implemented in Java with a 20ms simulation step. The code is available
from the original authors under the GNU General Public License version 3. The maximum
speed for all vehicles was 60 km/h. The entry and exit times of each vehicle are captured in
CSV files and then ingested to a MongoDB database for analysis.
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Active reservation Variable Value Result
No Distance to intersection <8 m or >50 m Do not request reservation
No Distance to vehicle in front <vehicle length Do not request reservation
No Distance change to vehicle in front Getting closer Do not request reservation
Yes Distance to vehicle in front <vehicle length Release reservation
Yes Distance change to vehicle in front Getting closer Release reservation
Table 5-1: Heuristics used for the deceiving method in the centralized reservation simu-
lation. The rules seek to prevent vehicles from causing delays in their lane by
either not requesting or canceling reservations with conflicting potential.
5.1. Results
In this implementation, vehicles were unable to gain an advantage by deceiving. Even though
our deceiving vehicles did take advantage of the opportunity to send a reservation request
before the leading vehicle entered the intersection, they did not gain a consistent advantage
over non-deceiving vehicles. The reason for the failure to gain an advantage is that the
deceiving vehicles could prevent the leading vehicle from obtaining a reservation. Blocking the
vehicle in front of the deceiving vehicle from crossing the intersection negates any advantage
that could be gained. Additionally, if the deceiving is too aggressive, it can increase the
delays experienced by vehicles on the roads with deceiving vehicles on them, including the
deceiving vehicles themselves.
Figure 5-2: Delay for vehicles in all lanes with a symmetric traffic rate where RateA =
RateB = 2 vehicles/s and ProbabilityB = 0. Each box represents the distribu-
tion of delays for a value of ProbabilityA
We reduced the chances of deceiving vehicles interrupting vehicles in front of them by im-
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plementing the heuristics in table 5-1. After implementing the heuristics, we obtained the
results from figure 5-2 where we see that the distribution of delays is not affected by chan-
ges in the deceiving level. We found similar results for different traffic rates and deceiving
probabilities.
We cannot rule out the possibility of deceiving vehicles gaining an advantage using a different
strategy. One possibility is to develop deceiving vehicles that obtain a reservation from the
opposite lane and cancel it before requesting the actual reservation they need to traverse
the intersection. This deceiving strategy requires a different heuristic and can be explored
in future work.
6 Decentralized consensus
Finally, as an example of a decentralized consensus protocol, we selected the Distributed
Intersection Management (DIM) [González et al., 2019]. This protocol provides rules that
are simple to implement but guarantee the safety of vehicles. It has the interesting property
of favoring groups of vehicles, called convoys, over individual ones. Currently, the protocol
only supports single-lane roads without vehicles turning. As described in chapter 3, we
consider road A, with vehicles traveling north to south, and road B, with vehicles traveling
west to east. We have two parameters per road: the traffic rate (RateA and RateB) and the
probability that vehicles are deceivers (ProbabilityA and ProbabilityB).
Figure 6-1: Diagram of possible states for a vehicle in the decentralized consensus simula-
tion. The statuses were not part of the original work in [González et al., 2019]
but are added here for clarification purposes and are part of our implementation
of the protocol.
We can consider that vehicles in DIM can be in one of three states: Auto, Y ielding or
GainingPriority1. Figure 6-1 shows the relationship between the states and how vehicles
1These states are not in the original work, we use them here to aid the protocol explanation.
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transition from one to the next. In the Auto state, the vehicle follows an automatic driving
model and sends periodic messages requesting a leader in the opposite lane. If it does not
find a leader, the vehicle will traverse the intersection. If it receives a response from a vehicle
in the Auto state, the vehicle farthest from the intersection will transition to the Y ielding
state and the other will continue in the Auto state.
A vehicle in the Y ielding state will stop before the intersection and start a timer. At periodic
intervals, the vehicle will try to communicate with an opposite leader. If it does not find one,
it will return to the Auto state. Additionally, a vehicle in the Y ielding state will, after a
minimum waiting time, send messages to the vehicles behind it to determine how many
vehicles there are in the same lane, which could form a convoy to cross the intersection. The
DIM protocol has a configurable max time for yielding and a minimum convoy size; if the
vehicle meets either condition, it will transition to the GainingPriority state.
In the GainingPriority state, the vehicle will inform vehicles in the conflicting lane that
it is trying to transition back to the Auto state, and they should yield if possible. In some
cases, the vehicles in the yielding lane might be too close to the intersection to brake safely;
in that case, they inform the vehicle in the GainingPriority state that they can not yield. A
vehicle will remain in the GainingPriority state until all the responses it receives from the
opposite lane indicate that the vehicles have transitioned to the Y ielding state. A vehicle in
the Auto state is expected to transition to the Y ielding status if it can stop safely before
the intersection.
The DIM protocol offers multiple opportunities for deception as it does not include any
mechanism to validate the messages between vehicles. For our simulation, we focused on
the convoy formation condition. A deceiving vehicle that must transition to the Y ielding
state will transition to the GainingPriority state immediately after it has waited for the
minimum wait time. Additionally, deceiving vehicles that are not at the front of the lane
will try to deceive the leader when it sends the message to find the current convoy’s size.
Making the leader believe that a convoy is larger than the minimum convoy size for gaining
priority causes a non-deceiving leader to transition to the GainingPriority state, amplifying
the effect of the deceiving vehicles in the intersection.
The DIM simulator was not available for use or modification. We worked together with the
primary author of the work to create an implementation using the open source traffic simu-
lation tool SUMO [Lopez et al., 2018]. In our implementation, SUMO controls the vehicles
in the Auto state. SUMO provides an application programming interface known as TraCI
(Traffic Control Interface) that allows programs to interact with the simulation and send
instructions to the vehicles. We created a Python application that uses TraCI to interact
with the SUMO simulation and creates the stage machine and communication described
above to implement the DIM protocol.
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6.1. Results
As with the centralized consensus protocol, we executed simulation with symmetric and
asymmetric traffic scenarios. The results between the scenarios are similar; we present them
below.
6.1.1. Symmetric traffic
Figure 6-2: Results for symmetric traffic where RateA = RateB = 900 vehicles/h. Each
point represents the proportion of vehicles that went through the system
against the maximum across all the experiments shown in the graph. For
this combination of rates, the maximum number of vehicles were served with
ProbabilityA = 0,25 and ProbabilityB = 0. Each of the lines represents a value
of ProbabilityB.
We present the proportion of vehicles that can traverse the intersection against the maxi-
mum in figure 6-2 for the case where both lanes have the same traffic volume, RateA =
RateB = 900 vehicles/h. In this case, the maximum volume of vehicles was served when
ProbabilityA = 0,25 and ProbabilityB = 0. We see a trend that shows that as ProbabilityA
or ProbabilityB increases, the capacity of the intersection decreases. In this protocol, we do
not see different behavior when ProbabilityB = 1 because the DIM protocol includes the
timeout rule, which prevents a single road from getting priority for long periods.
We also consider how the distribution of the delays experienced by vehicles on the roads
change as deceivers are introduced in one of the lanes. In figure 6-3, we see the cases where
there are no deceivers in lane B, and we introduce different levels of deceivers in lane A.
Looking at the distribution of delays for lane A, we find a trend that shows that as more
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Figure 6-3: Delay for vehicles in lane A (left), lane B (center) and both lanes (right),
with a symmetric traffic rate where RateA = RateB = 900 vehicles/h and
ProbabilityB = 0.
deceivers are introduced in the lane, the delays experienced by the vehicles in the lane
decrease. The opposite behavior is observed in lane B; looking at the delays for both lanes,
we see that the range of possible values for the delay increases while the average delay
remains nearly constant. As expected, we see the most extreme values when all the vehicles
are deceiving in lane A, which causes all vehicles in lane B to experience high delays.
6.1.2. Asymmetric traffic
For the asymmetric case we consider an intersection where RateA = 1200 vehicles/h and
RateB = 600 vehicles/h. in figure 6-4, there is a tendency towards lower capacity as the
probably of deceiving increases. The highest capacity for this set of simulation runs was
accomplished when there were no deceivers in either lane, that is, where ProbabilityA =
ProbabilityB = 0. There is an interesting point where ProbabilityA = 0,2 and ProbabilityB =
0,4, which suggests an increase in the intersection capacity when the probability of deceivers
in lane A, which has the highest traffic rate, increases. This increase is not sustained and is
also not present for different values of ProbabilityB.
Figure 6-5 shows the distribution of delays for the lanes and the intersection with different
values for ProbabilityA. As in the symmetric case, the distribution of delays for lane A shows
that as more deceivers are introduced in the lane, the delays experienced by the vehicles in
the lane decrease. The opposite behavior is also observed in lane B, and we also see the
effect of an increased range of possible values for the delay across the system. As in figure
6-4, there is no clear evidence suggesting that increasing the probability of deceivers in the
higher traffic lane improves the overall capacity of the intersection, as was the case with our
centralized consensus protocol.
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Figure 6-4: Results for asymmetric traffic where RateA = 1200 vehicles/h and RateB =
600 vehicle/h. Each point represents the proportion of vehicles that went th-
rough the system against the maximum across all the experiments shown in
the graph. For this combination of rates, the maximum number of vehicles we-
re served with ProbabilityA = ProbabilityB = 0. Each of the lines represents a
value of ProbabilityB.
Figure 6-5: Delay for vehicles in lane A (left), lane B (center) and both lanes (right),
with an asymmetric traffic rate where RateA = 1200 vehicles/h, RateB =
600 vehicles/h and ProbabilityB = 0.
7 Conclusions
Our work shows that it is possible to introduce deceiving vehicles in autonomous intersection
management protocols. We explored three different protocols classified according to how
distributed the decision making was and the type of algorithm used to decide what lane
to prioritize in a given moment. For consensus-based protocols, in both the centralized and
decentralized flavors, the deceiving vehicles we introduced were able to gain an advantage,
reducing their expected delays; we call these vehicles effective deceivers. In the case of the
centralized reservation protocol we explored, AIM, the deceiving vehicles were not able to
gain an advantage over other vehicles.
We found that for protocols where effective deceivers were possible, the reduction of delays
was apparent not just for deceiving vehicles but for all vehicles in the deceiving vehicles’ road.
As the probability of introducing deceivers in a lane increases, provided the probability of
deceivers in the opposite road remains constant, the trend is for delays to decrease and the
road’s capacity in the intersection to increase accordingly.
As the delays decrease in a lane, with a higher proportion of deceiving vehicles being intro-
duced, we see an increase in the conflicting lane’s delays. In general, protocols can cope with
deceiving vehicles without collapsing, attesting to the flexibility of the protocols and their
efficiency. Unless extreme cases are considered, like all vehicles being deceivers in a lane and
none on the conflicting one, deceiving vehicles still perceive some delays.
When we introduced deceivers in both lanes, the delays for all vehicles increase, and the
overall capacity of the intersection is diminished. As such, it is crucial to note that in most
cases, from the perspective of a single vehicle, the best strategy is to deceive as it will result
in the minimum delay regardless of vehicles in the opposite lane deciding to deceive or not.
Considering the classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma [Wooldridge, 2012] from the field
of game theory, we can see that an intersection where deceiving is possible will result in
similar behavior. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, the net positive outcome from the system
perspective is to collaborate, but the incentives make it rational to deceive to account for
the other vehicles’ possibility of deception.
Given the incentives for deceiving in protocols where it is possible, we pose that it is impera-
tive for authors of autonomous intersection protocols to consider the possibility of deceiving
vehicles in their systems and introduce mechanisms to prevent them from becoming effective.
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If deceiving is not considered, intersections can experience a degradation of their capacity,
which can translate into a lower quality of service for its users.
Autonomous intersection protocols need to consider the message exchange in the protocol,
explore possibilities of deceiving, and incorporate cryptography tools like encryption and sig-
natures [Lima et al., 2016] to mitigate them. They should also include tools to guarantee the
information’s veracity, which we exploited in our consensus-based examples, incorporating
sensor or software-based mechanisms.
Given that autonomous intersections are an active research topic, we think that future works
should include testing other protocols to examine the possibility of incorporating deceiving
vehicles; that includes testing different deceiving approaches for AIM. An additional family
of possible future works is to propose improvements for existing protocols, like DIM, to
mitigate the effects of deceiving vehicles. Finally, another opportunity for further research is
to detect deceiving vehicles identifying changes on average delay overtime in an intersection.
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